Pay referents and satisfaction with pay: Does occupational proximity matter? by Georgellis, Yannis et al.
British Journal of Management, Vol. 00, 1–15 (2017)
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8551.12272
Pay Referents and Satisfaction with Pay:
Does Occupational Proximity Matter?
Yannis Georgellis , Stephen M. Garcia,1 Andros Gregoriou2
and Mustafa Ozbilgin3
Kent Business School, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7FS, UK, 1University of Michigan, 809
Weiser Hall, Ann Arbor, MI, USA 48109, 2University of Brighton, Lewes Road, Brighton BN2 4AT, Sussex,
UK and 3Brunel Business School, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK
Corresponding author email: y.georgellis@kent.ac.uk
We explore whether employees compare their pay to the pay of others in a similarly pres-
tigious occupation and, if so, whether this comparison has a negative impact on pay satis-
faction. Using an experimental vignette methodology, Study 1 found that people are more
inclined to compare with others from a similar or identical occupation and that compar-
ison negatively impacts pay satisfaction. This comparison and its negative effect is par-
ticularly strong in high-prestige occupations. Based on survey data, Study 2 also showed
that the average pay of others in occupations of similar prestige is negatively correlated
with employees’ pay satisfaction. This negative correlation was also stronger in higher-
prestige occupations. Our analysis highlights the importance of occupational prestige as
a main factor inﬂuencing pay comparison.
Introduction
Social comparisons are prevalent in both the work
and life domains. As interdependence theorists
posit, it is in our human nature to use others’
achievements as a benchmark to evaluate our own
(Buunk and Gibbons, 2007; De Botton, 2005).
This desire to keep up with our peers inﬂuences
many daily and longer-term decisions, including
what to consume, where to live orwhom to select as
our partner (Burleigh andMeegan, 2013; Luttmer,
2005; Watson and McLanahan, 2011; Wu, Garcia
and Kopelman, 2017). Our innate desire to com-
pare our pay or status to that of our peers also
inﬂuences our workplace attitudes, performance
and well-being (Duffy et al., 2012; Gartenberg
and Wulf, 2017; Obloj and Zenger, 2017). In
the present analysis, we explore how social com-
parison inﬂuences pay satisfaction and, more
speciﬁcally, how the impact of social comparison
on pay satisfaction is stronger among occupations
of similar standing than dissimilar ones. By using
the occupational code index that is based on
social standing in society – the Cambridge Social
Interaction and Stratiﬁcation Scale, or ‘CAMSIS’
(Prandy and Lambert, 2003) – we are able to probe
for the effects of occupational similarity as well
as explore whether the effect of social comparison
on pay satisfaction is greater among higher-tier
occupations than lower-tier occupations.
The present analysis also makes interdis-
ciplinary contributions to the management
literature at several different levels. First, our anal-
ysis contributes to the pay-satisfaction literature
by showing that occupational proximity inﬂuences
pay comparison, thus adding amacro-level dimen-
sion to pay comparison research. Second, whereas
economists perennially debate how to construe
the reference group to understand pay satisfaction
(e.g. Bordia and Blau, 1998; Luna-Arocas and
Tang, 2015), the present analysis contributes to
this economic debate by establishing occupational
similarity as an important factor. Third, the
present analysis offers a strong empirical contri-
bution to the social comparison literature, which is
principally based on social psychological research
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that is typically limited to laboratory settings or
artiﬁcial contexts. Finally, because pay satisfaction
is associated with employee performance, turnover
intentions, absenteeism and workplace deviance
(Bhave, Kramer and Glomb, 2013; Georgellis
and Lange, 2012; Kish-Gephart, Harrison and
Trevino, 2010; Pacheco et al., 2016; Ridge, Hill
and Aime, 2017; Schreurs et al., 2013; Tekleab,
Bartol and Liu, 2005), the present analysis offers
important implications for human resource man-
agement by highlighting speciﬁc circumstances
under which social comparison has the potential
to impact pay satisfaction.
In the course of this analysis, we will discuss
whether social comparison has a positive or
negative impact on pay satisfaction (Card et al.,
2012; Godechot and Senik, 2015), review the
literature that suggests that occupational sim-
ilarity matters (e.g. Festinger, 1954; Kulik and
Ambrose, 1992), and extrapolate rankings and
social comparison ﬁndings (Garcia, Tor and
Schiff, 2013) to understand why we might expect
that the level of prestige of an occupation will
moderate social comparison’s impact on pay
satisfaction. To test our hypotheses, Study 1 uses
an experimental decision-making methodology to
establish the links between social comparison, pay
satisfaction and occupational similarity. Study 2
empirically probes for these linkages in a dataset
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
to show how the average pay of others in a similar
occupation is correlated with pay satisfaction and
controlling for one’s own pay.
Comparison effects on pay satisfaction: Positive or
negative?
Whether pay comparison has a positive or a nega-
tive effect on individual well-being, or pay satisfac-
tion in particular, has been widely debated in the
management and organizational behaviour litera-
ture. Overwhelmingly, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that pay comparison has a negative effect on
individual well-being (Caporale et al., 2009). Still,
there is some evidence suggesting that comparison
pay has a potentially positive impact on well-being
because it provides information about an individ-
ual’s future prospects (Godechot and Senik, 2015).
We will next consider when pay comparison has
positive versus negative effects on well-being.
Pay comparison can yield positive effects on
well-being when the social comparison coincides
with a self-enhancement motive, which manifests
when people make a downward comparison with
those who are less fortunate than themselves
so that they can feel better about themselves
(Wills, 1981). For example, employees with a self-
enhancement motive will make comparisons with
those who earn a lower salary than themselves so
that they can feel better about their own salary.
On the ﬂip side, positive effects can also occur
with a self-improvement motive which manifests
when someone makes upward comparisons with
those who have higher salaries (Lockwood and
Kunda, 1997; Pavlova, Lechner and Silbereisen,
2017; Wood, 1989). Employees who are making
these upward comparisons become potentially
pleased with the pay comparison, not because
they discover that they make less than the com-
parison target, but because the comparison target
motivates them to earn a potentially higher salary
for themselves. These positive effects in the face of
an upward comparison can also reﬂect what Carol
Dweck (2007) calls a ‘growth mindset’; the opti-
mistic outlook that one has the potential to grow
and excel on any given dimension such as pay.
Despite some positive effects of pay compari-
son, more often than not, pay comparison can lead
to negative effects on well-being. It is generally
known, for example, that upward comparisons –
when people are exposed to others more fortunate
than themselves – can induce a negative effect
on well-being, such as envy (Salovey and Rodin,
1984). Likewise, Dweck (2007) argues that most
of us do not possess a ‘growth mindset’ but rather
a ‘ﬁxed mindset’ in which people see their own
performance in any given domain as being ﬁxed
or immutable. As a result, upward comparisons
can trigger a host of negative consequences such
as desperation, stress, discouragement and more.
Research on pay comparisons in particular has
indeed found an effect of others’ pay upon an indi-
vidual’s own pay satisfaction (Shaw, 2014; Trevor
and Wazeter, 2006), and this effect is broadly
negative. For example, although Card et al. (2012)
showed that the effect of pay comparisons did not
negatively or positively impact those above the pay
median in a large public organization, it did in fact
lead to less pay satisfaction among those who were
below the median. In this organizational context,
the effect of comparison was negative, on balance.
Large multinational analyses of happiness in
Europe also corroborate this general pattern (e.g.
Caporale et al., 2009). Across Europe, comparison
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with others’ income generally leads to lower hap-
piness, although this effect seems to be stronger
in Western Europe than Eastern Europe. Thus,
on balance, it seems likely that pay comparison
would have a negative effect on pay satisfaction.
Occupational similarity
We know from social comparison theory that peo-
ple compare themselves with others who are sim-
ilar to them in terms of performance (Festinger,
1954) or related attributes (Bartolini, Bilancini and
Sarracino, 2013; Clark and Senik, 2010; Danzer
et al., 2014; Garcia, Tor and Schiff, 2013; Good-
man, 1974; Kulik and Ambrose, 1992). While the
above literature has operationalized similarity in
several ways, as we will review next, it has yet to
probe for patterns of pay comparison as a func-
tion of occupational prestige similarity. Given the
fact that our societies are fundamentally based on
status hierarchies (De Botton, 2005), probing for
similarity in occupational prestige as a factor that
affects social comparison and pay satisfaction is
important.
Accordingly, we argue that pay comparisons are
more prevalent within the same or closely related
occupations in terms of occupational prestige.
According to social comparison theory (Festinger,
1954), we should expect that pay comparisons
intensify within the same profession or a closely
related occupational group. As Festinger notes,
‘Given a range of possible persons for comparison,
someone close to one’s own ability or opinion
will be chosen for comparison’ (p. 121). Although
Festinger was not speaking about occupational
similarity per se, this notion of similarity was sub-
sequently applied to the management literature
by Kulik and Ambrose (1992), who theorized two
important aspects of pay referent selection: the
availability of information and the relevance of
the referent. Factors that inﬂuence the availability
of information include situational characteristics
(i.e. job facet, change in procedures, physical
proximity) as well as personal characteristics
(i.e. gender, race, age, position), which is also
consistent with the related attributes account of
similarity (Goethals and Darley, 1977).
Where empirical studies that examine some
form of similarity exist, they typically deﬁne ref-
erence group similarity using a variety of personal
(i.e. gender, race, age) or situational characteristics
(i.e. physical proximity, change in procedures).
For example, McBride’s (2001) measure is based
on the average pay of individuals of similar age,
similar educational attainment and proximal
geographical area. Blau’s (1994) study of pay-level
satisfaction uses ﬁve different pay referents (ﬁnan-
cial, historical, organization, market and social).
Using Australian data, Brown (2001) deﬁnes the
market referent as the earnings of employees
doing similar work in other organizations and
identiﬁes this to be the strongest predictor of pay
satisfaction. Berkowitz et al. (1987) use other
people’s earnings in a broader sense as one of
four potential factors affecting pay satisfaction.
Law and Wong (1998) identify colleagues with
the same qualiﬁcations as the most important
referents. In their study of social comparisons and
redistributive justice in East Asia, Kim, Edwards
and Shapiro (2014) deﬁne the ‘referent other’ to be
someone with similar job responsibilities, similar
education and similar experience.
However, in the present analysis, we are in-
terested in not just any personal or situational
characteristic, but rather occupational similarity
that takes into account the similarity of the
prestige of the occupation. In other words, we are
interested in how the occupations at different tiers
of society themselves can become the basis of pay
comparison and thus have an effect on pay sat-
isfaction. To this end, a commonly used measure
of occupational prestige (CAMSIS) was ﬁrst in-
troduced in the literature by Stewart, Prandy and
Blackburn (1973) and later revised by Prandy and
Lambert (2003) to conform with the 1990 Stan-
dard Occupational Classiﬁcation (SOC). Research
on CAMSIS suggests that occupations are more
than just mere classiﬁcation codes, but rather indi-
cators of relative status within any given country.
For example, although doctors and lawyers repre-
sent different professions and different industrial
classiﬁcation codes, the CAMSIS scale classiﬁes
them as being similar professions in terms of
relative prestige. For this reason, we seek to probe
for the ﬁrst time how similarity in terms of occu-
pational prestige affects pay comparison and pay
satisfaction.
Accordingly, and in light of the weight of exist-
ing evidence on the negative association between
social comparison and well-being, we argue that
the negative inﬂuence of pay comparison on pay
satisfaction is more prevalent within the same
or similarly prestigious occupations. Thus, we
propose the following hypotheses.
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H1a: The more similar or identical the prestige
of others’ occupation, the greater an individual’s
tendency to compare pay.
H1b: The more similar or identical the prestige
of others’ occupation, the stronger the negative
impact of pay comparison on pay satisfaction.
Moderating inﬂuence of higher occupational
prestige
While we hypothesize that employees will be
inclined to make comparison with occupational
groups of similar prestige, research suggests that
this tendency for employees to compare them-
selves with others of similar rank (Garcia, Tor and
Gonzales, 2006) intensiﬁes as occupational pres-
tige increases. Thus, we argue that an employee’s
relative position in the occupational prestige dis-
tribution moderates the effect of pay referents on
pay satisfaction. Experimental evidence supports
the notion that social comparison intensiﬁes with
proximity to the #1 rank and most prestigious
rank (Garcia and Tor, 2007; Garcia, Tor and
Gonzales, 2006). For example, rivals who are com-
mensurately ranked #2 and #3 in the organization
are more likely to be concerned about how their
outcomes compare with each other, in contrast
to rivals who are commensurately but intermedi-
ately ranked #202 and #203 in the organization.
Relatedly, Brown et al. (2008) provide evidence
that employees’ well-being at work depends on the
ordinal rank of an individual’s earnings within a
comparison group, not simply on relative earnings.
The aforementioned negative effect of referent pay
on one’s attitudes is often stronger amongst high
earners and CEOs, as pay comparisons and the se-
lection of peer groups to benchmark performance
become more salient (Skovoroda and Bruce,
2017). Against this background, we test whether
being in a higher-prestige occupation moderates
the effect of pay referents on pay-level satisfaction.
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis.
H2: The negative correlation between the pay of
others in the same or a similarly prestigious oc-
cupation and pay satisfaction is stronger for em-
ployees in higher-prestige occupations.
Study 1: Experimental approach
Study 1 uses an experimental decision-making
methodology to ﬁnd evidence that (Hypothesis 1a)
comparisons are greater as similarity intensiﬁes
(i.e. the same versus a different occupation) and
that (Hypothesis 1b) the pay of others in similarly
prestigious occupations has a negative impact on
pay satisfaction. This study additionally probes for
evidence of Hypothesis 2 – that the negative effect
of comparison is stronger in higher-prestige occu-
pations than it is in lower-prestige occupations.
Participants
A total of 200 participants (41% female, average
age 32.19, 65% full-time employees) were recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turks in the USA to
complete a short online survey.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants read a
vignette in which the referent person was always
of commensurate prestige but varied in terms of
whether it was an identical or non-identical profes-
sion as themselves. We additionally varied whether
their prestige was high or low, choosing occupa-
tions with comparable CAMSIS US scores. The
high-prestige version read:
Imagine that you are a physician who makes about
$170,000 a year. To what extent would you be in-
clined to compare your salary to another [physi-
cian/lawyer] across the street? (0= not at all, 7= very
much)
If you learned that the [physician/lawyer] across the
street made 15% more money than you, to what ex-
tent would that affect your pay satisfaction? (0 = not
at all, 7 = very much)
How satisﬁed would you be with your pay of
$170,000? (0 = not at all, 7 = very much)
The low-prestige version was identical, except
that the participants were asked to imagine being a
ﬁle clerk with a $30,000 salary and the referent per-
son was either (a) another ﬁle clerk or (b) a plaster
and stucco mason. We also collected information
on their gender, age, employment status, ethnicity
and region in the USA.
Results
Consistent with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, a multi-
variate analysis of variance reveals a signiﬁcant
main effect of occupational proximity on the
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following three outcomes.1 First, the tendency to
compare one’s salary with the reference person
was greater when the professions were identi-
cal (M = 4.54, SD = 1.95) rather than different
(M= 2.51, SD= 2.07; F(1,198)= 50.5, p< 0.001).
Second, participants felt that learning the refer-
ent’s salary was higher than their own would affect
their own pay satisfaction more when the profes-
sions were identical (M = 4.55, SD = 1.96) rather
than different (M = 2.47, SD = 1.93; F(1,198) =
57.0, p< 0.001). Finally, participants reported that
they would feel signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed with their
pay when the referent had an identical profession
(M = 3.79, SD = 2.05) rather than a different one
(M = 4.75, SD = 1.98; F(1,198) = 11.4, p <0.01).
This pattern of results is consistent with Hypoth-
esis 1a as it provides evidence that comparison is
greater as occupational proximity increases. It is
also consistent with Hypothesis 1b by providing
evidence that the negative impact on pay satisfac-
tion is greater as occupational proximity increases.
The pattern of results remains signiﬁcant, even
whenwe analyse the high-prestige and low-prestige
versions separately. In the high-prestige version,
the reported tendency to compare (Hypothesis 1a)
and the negative impact on pay satisfaction (Hy-
pothesis 1b) was greater when the referent was a
fellow physician (compare: M = 4.20, SD = 2.10;
impact: M = 3.84, SD = 1.99; pay satisfaction:
M = 5.06, SD = 1.59) rather than a lawyer (com-
pare: M = 2.46, SD = 1.98; impact: M = 2.27,
SD = 1.81; pay satisfaction: M = 5.77, SD = 1.40;
all p< 0.05). The same pattern emerges in the low-
prestige version when the referent was a fellow ﬁle
clerk (compare: M = 4.86, SD = 1.75; impact: M
= 5.24, SD = 1.67; pay satisfaction: M = 2.54,
SD = 1.66) versus a plaster and stucco mason
(compare:M= 2.57, SD= 2.18; impact:M= 2.67,
SD = 2.07; pay satisfaction: M = 3.67, SD = 1.96;
all p < 0.01). Thus, together these results suggest
that the tendency to compare and its negative im-
pact on pay satisfaction increase as the occupa-
tions become identical versus not identical, even
when the level of prestige is commensurate. These
results are also in accordance with Hypotheses 1a
and 1b.
1The pattern of results is the same regardless of whether
we analyse the entire sample or only the sub-sample of
full-time employees. Because the methodology of Study
1 is about psychological decision making, we decided to
report the results for the whole sample.
We can also probe this experimental dataset for
evidence of Hypothesis 2 – that the tendency to
compare is stronger among those in high-prestige
occupations rather than low-prestige occupations.
To do this, we conduct simple correlations by
the prestige of the occupations. In high-prestige
conditions, the tendency to compare and pay
satisfaction are negatively correlated (r = −0.381,
p < 0.001, n = 101). In low-prestige conditions,
however, the correlation is slightly negative yet
not signiﬁcant (r = −0.114, p = 0.26, n = 99). A
test between the two correlation coefficients shows
that r = −0.381 is a signiﬁcantly larger negative
coefficient than r = −0.114. Thus, consistent with
Hypothesis 2, it appears that the relationship
between pay satisfaction and the tendency to com-
pare is greater among high-prestige occupations
than low-prestige occupations.
Study 2: Empirical approach
Sample and procedure
The data are from 18 waves of the BHPS cov-
ering the period 1991–2008. The BHPS is a lon-
gitudinal survey, which started in 1991, survey-
ing 10,300 individuals in about 5500 households
across 250 geographical areas of the UK. In wave
9, the sample includes an additional 1500 house-
holds fromWales and Scotland, while in wave 11, it
also includes 2000 households from Northern Ire-
land. We restrict our sample to employees between
18 and 65 years of age, who work full time. We
deﬁne full-time employees to be those who report
usual weekly hours of 35 or more. In order to min-
imize the inﬂuence of outliers, we exclude from the
sample those who report usual weekly hours of
more than 65.
Measures
The dependent variable is satisfaction with pay.
Respondents were asked a question on satisfaction
with their pay. The responses were reported on
an ordinal scale of 1 to 7, where a value of 1 cor-
responds to ‘not satisﬁed at all’ whilst a value of
7 corresponds to ‘completely satisﬁed’. Because the
response categories in the ﬁrst wave of the BHPS
data are different from those in all later waves
(Conti and Pudney, 2011), we exclude the 1991
survey from the analysis. Figure 1 displays a bar
chart of these pay-satisfaction responses, with the
C© 2017 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 1. The distribution of pay satisfaction [Colour ﬁgure can be
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vertical axis showing the percentage of responses
in each pay-satisfaction category. The distribution
of pay satisfaction is skewed, with 7.79%of respon-
dents being completely satisﬁed with their pay (re-
porting a score of 7), while 33.90% reported a score
of 6. A small proportion, about 4.05%, of respon-
dents are completely dissatisﬁed with their pay.
To probe for evidence in support of our hypothe-
ses, we need to construct an operational measure
of referent pay. Our approach in constructing such
a measure relies on the underpinning assumption
that employees compare their pay with the aver-
age pay of others in the same occupational-prestige
sub-category. Hence, we create a measure of ref-
erent pay using the average pay of others in the
same or a similarly prestigious occupation. Occu-
pational prestige is captured by the CAMSIS scale,
which is based on data from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) longitudinal survey to assign a
prestige-scale score to all three-digit occupational
unit groups. The underpinning principle behind
theCAMSIS scale is that the prestige of an individ-
ual’s occupation is usually similar to that of the oc-
cupation of their spouse or cohabiting partner. Oc-
cupational assortativemating inmarriage is indeed
common, as individuals tend to marry others with
occupations of similar prestige; a lawyer is likely
to marry a doctor but unlikely to marry a manual
worker (Prandy and Lambert, 2003). CAMSIS is
scaled so that the national distribution of scores
has a range from 0 for the lowest-prestige to 100
for the highest-prestige occupation, with amean of
50 and a standard deviation of 15 (see Prandy and
Jones, 2001 for a more detailed description of how
the scale is constructed). Empirical evidence shows
that higher CAMSIS scores are associated with
higher income, higher job satisfaction and lower
mortality rates (Feinstein and Hammond, 2004).
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Figure 2. Pay and satisfaction with pay by occupational prestige
[Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
A difficulty in calculating referent pay using the
average pay for each CAMSIS score separately is
that we run into a small cell size problem because
of the continuous and very reﬁned nature of the
CAMSIS scores. While for the majority of CAM-
SIS scores there is a sufficiently large number of ob-
servations, there are scores for which a very small
number of observations are available. For example,
for an occupation with a CAMSIS score of 83.69,
there is only one observation in the sample. Simi-
larly, there is one observation for a score of 83.78
and six observations for a score of 84.73. To mit-
igate this problem of small cell sizes, we split the
CAMSIS scale into 17 sub-categories, as shown in
Appendix Table A1. Accordingly, we deﬁne a prox-
imal, similar-prestige occupation as one within the
same sub-category of the recoded CAMSIS scale.
At the lower end of the scale, we aggregate oc-
cupations with a CAMSIS score of less than 10,
while at the upper end, we aggregate those with
a score higher than 85. Table A1 displays the dis-
tribution of the recoded 17-sub-category CAMSIS
scale, whereas Figure 2 depicts the average pay and
satisfaction with pay for each sub-category. Aver-
age pay and satisfaction with pay are positively
correlated, and they increase monotonically with
occupational prestige.
As explained, the above approach to calculate
referent pay is based on the assumption that
employees compare their pay with the average pay
of others in the same occupational-prestige sub-
category. Nevertheless, it is important to consider
also the moderating inﬂuence of career stage and
location in pay comparisons. While we hypoth-
esize that the reference group consists of other
employees in similar-prestige occupations, we can-
not ignore the fact that pay differs considerably by
C© 2017 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Pay Referents and Pay Satisfaction 7
age and geographical location. Young employees
compare their pay with starting salaries in similar-
prestige occupations. They are unlikely to compare
their pay with that of older employees who have
accumulated seniority and work experience. By the
same token, although the referent group consists
of other employees in similar-prestige occupations,
the inﬂuence of pay differences across geograph-
ical locations needs also to be controlled for.
Differences in earnings and living costs, especially
housing costs, are salient across UK regions,
with particularly stark differences being evident
when comparing London and the South East with
the North (Cribb et al., 2013). Thus, to account
for the moderating role of age and for regional
variations in pay, we factor age categories and
UK regions into the calculation of referent pay.
More speciﬁcally, we consider three geographical
regions: (i) London and the South East; (ii) the
Midlands, Wales and the South West; and (iii) the
North, Scotland and Northern Ireland and ﬁve
age categories: (i) 18–25; (ii) 26–35; (iii) 36–45; (iv)
46–55; and (v) 56–65. We assume, for example,
that employees in the 18–25 age group, living in
London and the South East, compare their pay
with that of others in similar-prestige occupations
who are also in the 18–25 age group and live in
London and the South East. Hence, referent pay
(Y¯CAMSIS) is equal to the logarithm of the average
pay of other employees in the same occupational-
prestige category, within the same age group who
live in the same region. When calculating the aver-
age pay, we exclude the individual’s own earnings
from the calculation and use the cross-sectional
respondent sampling weights (XRWGHT), which
are available in the BHPS.
Analysis
Because of the ordinal nature of the dependent
variable, the empirical strategy in this study hinges
on the estimation of ordered probit regression
equations (see Mckelvey and Zavoina, 1975) for
satisfaction with pay (PAYSAT) of the following
form:
(PAYSAT)i t = βZit + γYit + δAY¯CAMSIS + eit
(1)
where Yit is individual i’s own pay at time t and eit
is a normally distributed random error term. The
coefficients β,γ and δA are to be estimated. The
main coefficient of interest is δA, which captures
the effect of referent pay Y¯CAMSIS on satisfaction
with pay. Zit is a vector of control variables that
includes age, education, marital status, number of
children, education, health, job sector, ﬁrm size
and managerial responsibilities (deﬁnitions and
sample means are shown in Appendix Table A2).
Other controls in the vector Zit include time and
occupation dummy variables. The inclusion of
time (year) dummies controls for inﬂation in pay,
increased inequality and other factors that may
have affected pay over the years. The purpose in
including occupational dummies is to ensure that
the effect of pay and comparison pay on satisfac-
tion is net of the potential inﬂuence of permanent
occupational-speciﬁc attributes. Occupational
dummies would pick up, for example, observed as
well as unobserved workplace characteristics such
as organizational culture, perceived managerial
support, inherent occupation-related stress and
other pecuniary and non-pecuniary occupational
characteristics. We estimate model (1) by treating
the data as a repeated cross-section, clustering
the standard errors to account for within-person
variation in pay satisfaction.
Results
To shed some initial light on whether referent
pay matters for pay satisfaction, a calculation of
simple partial correlation coefficients (r) reveals
that pay satisfaction is positively correlated with
own pay (r = 0.259), whereas it is negatively
correlated with referent pay (r = −0.036). Table 1
presents additional preliminary evidence on the
effect of own pay and referent pay on satisfaction.
The top panel of Table 1 shows that individuals
enjoy a higher level of pay satisfaction as they
move up to higher-pay quintiles. The bottom
panel of Table 1 examines the inﬂuence of referent
pay. More speciﬁcally, it displays how relative pay
(i.e. the ratio of own pay (Yit) and referent pay
(Y¯CAMSIS)) is correlated with pay satisfaction. It
emerges that when relative pay increases, average
satisfaction with pay also increases in a monotonic
fashion, from 3.930 for the lowest quintile to 5.734
for the highest quintile. Therefore, for any given
level of own pay, an increase in the pay of others
in the same or a similarly prestigious occupation
(Y¯CAMSIS) has a negative effect on satisfaction
with pay.
C© 2017 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Mean pay satisfaction levels
Mean Standard error
Own pay Yit: lowest quintile 4.182** 0.008
Own pay Yit: second quintile 4.506** 0.008
Own pay Yit: third quintile 4.811** 0.009
Own pay Yit: fourth quintile 5.028** 0.009
Own pay Yit: highest quintile 5.444** 0.008
Relative pay (Yit/Y¯CAMSIS): lowest quintile 3.930** 0.017
Relative pay (Yit/Y¯CAMSIS): second quintile 4.438** 0.017
Relative pay (Yit/Y¯CAMSIS): third quintile 4.963** 0.017
Relative pay (Yit/Y¯CAMSIS): fourth quintile 5.073** 0.017
Relative pay (Yit/Y¯CAMSIS): highest quintile 5.734** 0.017
Notes: +p< 0.1; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01. The F-statistic for the equality of means is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. All ﬁgures refer to weighted
data.
A more systematic analysis is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating the ordered
probit regression model of pay satisfaction for the
full sample in columns 1–2 and separately by gen-
der in columns 3–4 and in columns 5–6 for men
and women, respectively. The pooled sample com-
prises 67,110 person-year observations for 12,813
individuals. The standard errors are adjusted for
clustering on individuals (i.e. 12,813 clusters). The
chi-square p-values imply that the estimated mod-
els are statistically signiﬁcant compared with the
null models with no predictors. The McFadden
pseudo-R2 values convey a similar message about
the full model, with the likelihood ratio in the
McFadden pseudo-R2 indicating an improvement
over the intercept model.
Column 1 displays the estimated coefficients of a
baseline model of pay satisfaction, which includes
individuals’ own pay Yit. Most of the sociode-
mographic controls have the expected effect on
pay-level satisfaction. Brieﬂy, men are less satisﬁed
with their pay than women are. Consistent with
previous ﬁndings (Clark, Oswald and Warr, 1996),
there is a U-shaped relationship between age
and satisfaction with pay, reﬂecting individuals’
changing personal circumstances and changing
expectations over time. Compared with those who
are single/never married (the reference category),
separated employees are less satisﬁed with their
pay. Widowhood has a similar, negative effect
on satisfaction with pay. In general, education is
negatively associated with pay satisfaction. Em-
ployees with a higher degree are less satisﬁed with
their pay compared with those with no O-level or
vocational qualiﬁcations (the reference category).
The same is true for employees with a university
degree, a teaching qualiﬁcation, other higher qual-
iﬁcations and those with a nursing qualiﬁcation.
Notably, the results suggest that more education
is negatively correlated with pay satisfaction in an
almost monotonic fashion, with the dissatisfaction
of teachers and nurses being particularly strong.
Health has a positive inﬂuence on pay satisfaction.
Employees in excellent health report higher pay
satisfaction than those in poor or very poor health
(the reference category). Similarly, those in good
health or in fair health are more satisﬁed with their
pay. Pay satisfaction decreases with job tenure. It
is also generally lower for employees in medium or
large ﬁrms. As the estimated coefficients for ﬁrm
size suggest, pay satisfaction among employees in
smaller ﬁrms (less than 100 employees) is generally
higher than among employees in medium and
large ﬁrms. Finally, managers are generally more
satisﬁed with their pay than employees with no
managerial responsibilities.
Turning attention to the effect of own pay on
satisfaction, higher pay exerts a strong positive ef-
fect on pay satisfaction (β = 0.818, p < 0.01),
even after controlling for demographic and ﬁrm
characteristics. In column 2, we augment the base-
line model to include referent pay, Y¯CAMSIS, which
is negatively associated with satisfaction with pay
(β = −0.143, p < 0.01). Columns 3 and 4 display
the results of estimating pay-satisfaction-ordered
probit regressions based on the sample ofmale em-
ployees. Own earnings attract a positive and sig-
niﬁcant coefficient (β = 0.837, p < 0.01), whereas
referent pay is negatively associated with pay-level
satisfaction (β = −0.139, p < 0.1) at the 10% level
of signiﬁcance. Among the female employees sam-
ple, the estimated coefficients in columns 5 and
C© 2017 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Pay satisfaction regression (ordered probit estimation)
All Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yit 0.818** 0.824** 0.831** 0.837** 0.874** 0.887**
Y¯CAMSIS −0.143** −0.139+ −0.236**
Male −0.241** −0.241** — — — —
Age −0.053** −0.045** −0.061** −0.054** −0.054** −0.039**
(Age)2/1000 0.634** 0.546** 0.714** 0.645** 0.676** 0.497**
Number of children −0.007 −0.007 −0.015 −0.014 0.047** 0.047**
Marital status
Married −0.043 −0.043 0.038 0.039 −0.167** −0.169**
Separated −0.072** −0.073** 0.016 0.016 −0.188** −0.190**
Divorced 0.073 0.073 0.015 0.018 0.036 0.034
Widowed −0.081** −0.082** −0.022 −0.022 −0.164** −0.165**
Education
Higher degree −0.360** −0.360** −0.298** −0.298** −0.468** −0.468**
First degree −0.253** −0.254** −0.213** −0.213** −0.289** −0.293**
Teaching qualiﬁcation −0.265** −0.263** −0.302** −0.302** −0.268** −0.264**
Other higher qualiﬁcation −0.162** −0.162** −0.165** −0.164** −0.136** −0.136**
Nursing qualiﬁcation −0.275** −0.273** −0.401* −0.398* −0.248** −0.247**
GCSE A-level −0.156** −0.156** −0.175** −0.175** −0.105* −0.104*
GCSE O-level −0.060* −0.059* −0.081* −0.081* −0.030 −0.027
Health
Excellent 0.295** 0.294** 0.341** 0.342** 0.250** 0.248**
Good 0.175** 0.175** 0.230** 0.230** 0.116** 0.116**
Fair 0.045+ 0.045+ 0.088** 0.088** 0.000 −0.000
Job tenure −0.005** −0.005** −0.005** −0.005** −0.005* −0.005*
Private-sector employee 0.021 0.021 0.044 0.044 0.003 0.004
Manager 0.032+ 0.037+ 0.049* 0.055* −0.005 −0.000
Firm size
100–199 employees −0.075** −0.075** −0.067** −0.067** −0.083** −0.084**
200–499 employees −0.073** −0.074** −0.064** −0.065** −0.076* −0.078*
500–999 employees −0.060* −0.061** −0.050+ −0.051+ −0.075* −0.077*
> 1000 employees −0.090** −0.091** −0.062* −0.063* −0.122** −0.126**
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.041 0.041 0.047 0.047 0.041 0.042
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log-likelihood −108,954 −108,947 −67,404 −67,401 −41,039 −41,030
Restricted log-likelihood −113,663 −113,663 −70,751 −70,751 −42,812 −42,812
Number of clusters 12,813 7,258 5,555
Person-year observations 67,110 41,745 25,365
Notes: +p< 0.1; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01. Reference categories: Health, poor or very poor;Marital status, single/nevermarried; Education,
vocational qualiﬁcation, no O-level; Firm size, less than 100 employees;
McFadden pseudo-R2 = 1− (log-likelihood/restricted log-likelihood).
6 paint a similar picture. Although own earnings
is positively associated with pay satisfaction (β =
0.887, p < 0.01), referent pay is negatively associ-
ated with pay satisfaction (β = −0.236, p < 0.01).
To gain a greater appreciation of the quanti-
tative importance of these effects, it is necessary
to estimate marginal effects. Table 3 shows the
estimated marginal effects for the probability that
employees are very satisﬁed with their pay (i.e.
reporting pay-satisfaction scores of 6 or 7). The
marginal effects indicate that a 1% increase
in own pay (Yit) increases the probability of
employees reporting a pay satisfaction score of
6 by 18.7%, while it increases the probability of
a pay-satisfaction score of 7 by 11.1%. In the
bottom panel of Table 3, a 1% increase in referent
pay reduces the probability of a pay-satisfaction
score of 6 by 3.2% and the probability of a score
of 7 by 1.9%. The marginal effects for male and
female employees in columns 2 and 3 are similar,
although the effect of referent pay for females is
slightly stronger than that for males. A 1% in-
crease in referent pay reduces pay satisfaction for
females by 5.1% and 3.5% for satisfaction scores
C© 2017 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
10 Georgellis et al.
Table 3. Pay satisfaction regression – marginal effects
All Males Females
Yit
Prob(PAYSAT = 6) 0.187** 0.193** 0.191**
Prob(PAYSAT = 7) 0.111** 0.104** 0.133**
Y¯CAMSIS
Prob(PAYSAT = 6) −0.032** −0.032* −0.051**
Prob(PAYSAT = 7) −0.019** −0.017* −0.035**
N 67,110 41,745 25,365
Notes: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; other controls as in Table 2.
Table 4. Pay satisfaction regression (ordered probit estimation)
CAMSIS < 8 CAMSIS < = 10 CAMSIS > 10 CAMSIS > 14
All Females Males All Females Males All Females Males All Females Males
Yit 0.762** 0.839** 0.741** 0.872** 0.857** 0.785** 0.940** 0.824** 0.796** 0.836** 0.865** 0.895**
Y¯CAMSIS −0.052 −0.179 −0.111 −0.165 −0.099 −0.081 −0.272* −0.306* −0.263** −0.041 −0.718* −0.263
Notes: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; other controls as in Table 2.
Table 5. Pay satisfaction regression by occupational prestige – marginal effects
CAMSIS < 8 CAMSIS < = 10 CAMSIS > 10 CAMSIS > 14
All Females Males All Females Males All Females Males All Females Males
Yit
Prob(PAYSAT = 6) 0.171** 0.194** 0.165** 0.183** 0.201** 0.195** 0.161** 0.172** 0.178** 0.177** 0.170** 0.170**
Prob(PAYSAT = 7) 0.091** 0.095** 0.108** 0.099** 0.099** 0.121** 0.133** 0.128** 0.167** 0.144** 0.129** 0.134**
Y¯CAMSIS
Prob(PAYSAT = 6) −0.026 −0.041 0.011 −0.019 −0.023 −0.037 −0.053** −0.064* −0.052* −0.052 −0.141* −0.008
Prob(PAYSAT = 7) −0.014 −0.020 0.007 −0.010 −0.011 −0.023 −0.044** −0.048* −0.048* −0.042 −0.107* −0.007
aNotes: +p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; other controls as in Table 2.
of 6 and 7, respectively. In sum, the marginal
effects in Table 3 and the estimated coefficients in
Table 2 conﬁrm that employees’ pay satisfaction
is negatively correlated with the earnings of others
in occupations of similar prestige, thus lending
support for Hypothesis 1b.
In Tables 4 and 5, we explore whether there is
support for Hypothesis 2, namely whether the neg-
ative correlation between pay referents and pay sat-
isfaction is stronger in higher-prestige occupations.
Table 4 reveals that when splitting the sample into
low- and high-prestige occupations, referent pay
does not affect pay satisfaction for those in occupa-
tions with a prestige score of less than 8. The same
is true when we repeat the analysis for the sub-
group with a prestige score of less than or equal to
10. In contrast, referent pay does matter, having
a statistically signiﬁcant negative effect on pay
satisfaction for both male and female employees
in occupations with a prestige score higher than
10. Finally, when limiting the sample to those in
the most prestigious occupations, with a score
greater than 14, the negative effect of comparison
pay intensiﬁes for female employees. In Table 5,
the estimated marginal effects further support
Hypothesis 2. In high-prestige occupations, a 1%
increase in referent pay reduces the probability
of female employees reporting a pay satisfaction
score of 6 by about 14% and the probability of a
score of 7 by about 10%. For occupations with a
prestige score greater than 10, the reduction in the
probability of high satisfaction (score 6 or 7) is
about 5–6%. As Table 5 conﬁrms, referent pay has
no effect on the pay satisfaction of employees in
low-prestige occupations.
Discussion and conclusion
Using an experimental decision-making method-
ology, Study 1 found that pay comparison and
its negative impact on pay satisfaction are more
prevalent among individuals in the same or
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similar-prestigious occupations (Hypotheses 1a
and 1b), in support of the view that occupational
proximity matters. In addition, the negative corre-
lation between pay comparison and pay satisfac-
tion is stronger among high-prestige occupations
than low-prestige occupations (Hypothesis 2).
Probing a dataset comprising full-time employees,
Study 2 empirically found the same pattern of re-
sults among survey participants of the BHPS.
Such ﬁndings add weight to previous studies
suggesting that awareness of others’ pay in similar
occupations spurs a negative emotional response,
which is detrimental to employee morale. The
study by Card et al. (2012), which explores the
effects of pay disclosure on pay satisfaction at
three campuses of the University of California,
conﬁrms that such disclosure had a negative
impact on pay satisfaction among lower-paid
workers and prompted them to seek new em-
ployment. Such ﬁndings have direct implications
for the design of compensation structures within
organizations, calling for a re-evaluation of the
relative merits of compressed versus dispersed
earnings distributions.
Furthermore, the present analysis has potential
implications for whether pay secrecy practices are
justiﬁed in terms of promoting workforce cohe-
sion. There has been renewed interest in exploring
the relative merits of pay secrecy in recent years,
following President Obama’s executive order in
April 2014 to strengthen pay openness and disclo-
sure practices. Similar measures were announced
in 2015 by UK Prime Minister Cameron to make
it compulsory for companies with more than 250
employees to disclose male and female employ-
ees’ pay. The beneﬁt of pay openness is that it im-
proves informational, procedural and distributive
justice, with a positive effect on organizational cit-
izenship behaviours (Marasi and Bennett, 2016).
However, as Marasi and Bennett (2016) also ar-
gue, pay openness could have a damaging effect for
organizational outcomes by spurring workplace
deviance or unethical conduct. In a similar vein,
Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2017) ﬁnd that pay
transparency has a negative effect on employees’
willingness to help their co-workers. To the ex-
tent that employees are affected by the pay of oth-
ers, pay disclosure could cause lower pay satis-
faction, especially in higher-prestige occupations.
More speciﬁcally, while a general knowledge of
others’ pay in the same or similar occupations is
often demoralizing, triggering negative emotions,
this effect may be less prevalent in lower-prestige
occupations.
That said, the ﬁndings need to be evaluated in
light of the following limitations. First, there is
an implicit assumption that employees have ac-
cess to pay information about others at the level of
their occupational code. Although we cannot ver-
ify which individuals had access to such informa-
tion, one can still foster a sense of pay information
through a variety of news outlets (i.e. Chronicle of
Higher Education), trade magazines and websites
(i.e. payscale.com) that publish average salary in-
formation for a variety of industries. Thus, most
individuals should have some sense of the variation
of pay across industries. A second limitation is that
we assume all participants have the same level of
equity sensitivity. Clearly, such sensitivity is likely
to vary from person to person, although we can-
not control for these individual differences in our
BHPS analyses. However, the experimental deci-
sionmethodology used in Study 1 helps tomitigate
this individual difference concern by randomly as-
signing participants to conditions. While this ex-
perimental approach additionally helps to uncover
the comparison process, we acknowledge that it is
based on a hypothetical vignette and lacks the re-
alism of the BHPS. However, we are reminded of
the beneﬁts of this experimental decision-making
methodology by economics Nobel Prize winner
Daniel Kahneman (2000): ‘Choice . . . is the fruit
ﬂy of decision theory. It is a very simple case, which
contains many essential elements of much larger
problems. As with the fruit ﬂy, we . . . hope that
the principles that govern the simple case will ex-
tend in recognizable form to complex situations’
(p. xi). Thus, the experimental approach in Study 1
and the empirical approach in Study 2 complement
each other well.
As for future directions, one path is to explore
whether the results are replicated in an analysis of
household data from other countries or cultures.
While we would assume that British household
data would closely resemble data from other west-
ern cultures such as the USA or Germany, perhaps
the dynamics we observe would differ from those
of eastern cultures such as Korea, China or Japan,
where the construal of self is based on an inter-
dependent versus independent self (Kim, Edwards
and Shapiro, 2014; Oshio, Nozaki and Kobayashi,
2011).
Finally, although our discussion has focused on
how pay comparisons affect pay satisfaction, it
C© 2017 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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would be interesting to explore possible solutions
and remedies to mitigate the negative effects of pay
comparison. Because employees develop affective
feelings not only towards their level of pay but also
towards the system used to deliver pay (Heneman
and Schwab, 1985), we believe that such remedies
need to includemeasures to improve the fairness of
rewards and pay disclosure systems. As one would
expect, any initiatives to mitigate the impact of pay
comparison need to be part of a comprehensive
human resource strategy to boost employee well-
being, beyond measures of pay satisfaction.
Appendix
Table A1. The distribution of recoded CAMSIS
Males Females
Cambridge
scale value
Recoded
Cambridge scale No. % No. %
0/9.99 1 1229 2.9 95 0.4
10/14.99 2 2193 5.2 296 1.2
15/19.99 3 4708 11.2 881 3.5
20/24.99 4 4761 11.3 1627 6.4
25/29.99 5 4074 9.7 859 3.4
30/34.99 6 2093 5 1316 5.2
35/39.99 7 2611 6.2 2173 8.5
40/44.99 8 4153 9.9 6380 25
45/49.99 9 2747 6.5 2161 8.5
50/54.99 10 3644 8.7 2315 9.1
55/59.99 11 2110 5 1283 5
60/64.99 12 3677 8.8 2251 8.8
65/69.99 13 2119 5 1446 5.7
70/74.99 14 470 1.1 1224 4.8
75/79.99 15 593 1.4 395 1.5
80/84.99 16 443 1.1 554 2.2
> = 85 17 351 0.9 239 0.9
Total 41,976 100 25,495 100
Table A2. Deﬁnition of variables and summary statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. dev.
Satisfaction with pay Integer response on a 1–7 scale to the question: ‘How satisﬁed are
you with your pay?’
4.79 1.55
Male Dummy variable: 1 for male; 0 otherwise 0.62 0.48
Age Age in years 37.46 11.48
Marital status
Married Dummy variable: 1 for married; 0 otherwise 0.55 0.43
Separated Dummy variable: 1 for separated; 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17
Divorced Dummy variable: 1 for divorced; 0 otherwise 0.10 0.31
Widowed Dummy variable: 1 for widowed; 0 otherwise 0.01 0.09
Number of children Number of own children in household 0.53 0.89
Education
Higher degree Dummy variable: 1 for higher degree; 0 otherwise 0.04 0.18
First degree Dummy variable: 1 for ﬁrst degree; 0 otherwise 0.15 0.36
Teaching qualiﬁcation Dummy variable: 1 for teaching qualiﬁcation; 0 otherwise 0.02 0.13
Other higher qualiﬁcation Dummy variable: 1 for other higher qualiﬁcation; 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45
Nursing qualiﬁcation Dummy variable: 1 for nursing; 0 otherwise 0.01 0.10
GCSE A-level Dummy variable: 1 for GCSE A-level; 0 otherwise 0.14 0.34
GCSE O-level Dummy variable: 1 for GCSE O-level; 0 otherwise 0.18 0.39
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Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. dev.
Health
Excellent Dummy variable: 1 for excellent health; 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45
Good Dummy variable: 1 for good health; 0 otherwise 0.49 0.50
Fair Dummy variable: 1 for fair health; 0 otherwise 0.18 0.38
Job tenure Job tenure in years 4.45 6.08
Private sector Dummy variable: 1 for private-sector employee; 0 otherwise 0.72 0.45
Manager Dummy variable: 1 for having managerial duties; 0 otherwise 0.25 0.44
Firm size
100–199 employees Dummy variable: 1 for ﬁrm size between 100 and 199
employees; 0 otherwise
0.11 0.32
200–499 employees Dummy variable: 1 for ﬁrm size between 200 and 499
employees; 0 otherwise
0.14 0.35
500–999 employees Dummy variable: 1 for ﬁrm size between 500 and 999
employees; 0 otherwise
0.08 0.27
1000 or more employees Dummy variable: 1 for ﬁrm size larger than 1000 employees;
0 otherwise
0.12 0.32
Yit Log of hourly wage Hourly wage = [(usual pay per month ×
12)/52]/(usual weekly hours of work)
2.15 0.52
Number of clusters 12,813
Person-year observations 67,110
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